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ABSTRACT The IoT-as-a-Service (IoTaaS) business model has already been identified by some people from
both industry and academia, but has not been formally defined. IoTaaS offers IoT devices on demand, with
considerable cost savings and resource optimization. In addition, it enables different applications to reuse
the existing devices. However, this business model is associated with different technological challenges that
need to be addressed, one of which is the identity problem. Focusing on this, self-sovereign identity (SSI)
schemes have proven to provide better privacy and scalability than traditional identity paradigms, which
is especially important in the IoT owing to its characteristics. In this paper, we formally analyze an IoTaaS
businessmodel, identifying and detailing itsmain technological challenges. In addition, we tackle the identity
problem of this business model and propose an SSI-based identity management system, which is compliant
with the existing standards from the W3C, and include a performance evaluation.
INDEX TERMS IoT, as-a-service, IoTaaS, identity management, SSI.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ‘‘as-a-service’’ label has become incredibly popular
nowadays. In the context of the Internet, it is not necessary
to own a resource to use it. In ‘‘as-a-service’’ models, users
of resources can reduce costs, as they avoid investing on its
acquisition, while owners of resources can monetize their
investments by offering services based on those assets to
interested users. In other words, ‘‘as-a-service’’ often implies
a win-to-win situation for both the user and the owner of
a resource. The Netflix use-case [1] is a perfect example
of a successful ‘‘as-a-service’’ solution, where a traditional
use-case (watching films on the Internet) is redefined as a
subscription-based business model. However, other business
models could also be mentioned, such as the pay-per-use
model, where users pay for the time they use the service.
Another widely known ‘‘as-a-service’’ solution is Amazon
Web Services (AWS) [2], where any user can use cloud
computing and storage capabilities, thus paying only for the
utilized amount of time or traffic.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yu-Huei Cheng .
On the other hand, the expansion of the Internet of
Things (IoT) is remarkable. IoT is being integrated into
numerous solutions owing to its ubiquity. According to the
study in [3], the number of connected devices around the
world is expected to increase from 20.4 billion in 2020 to
75.0 in 2025. Considering the expected number of IoT
devices, it is likely that many of them remain underused.
Thus, it is necessary to think about ideas and solutions to
reuse existing devices, rather than creating new ones, thus
avoiding the negative consequences of overpopulating our
environment with IoT devices [4]. In addition, IoT devices
are often deployed in a particular environment, so solutions
that effectively enable the reuse of these devices for other
purposes are very welcomed. For example, an IoT device
measuring temperature at a specific location may be useful
for researchers interested in its data for its own application.
In this context, the IoT-as-a-Service (IoTaaS) business
model is being coined as a solution to these problems, adding
special value when it comes to enabling different applications
aimed at optimizing the use of IoT devices. However, despite
some blog entries from industry [5] have scratched the surface
over this term, as well as the research community [6], [7],
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these references do not go deep into the business model
description and operation. Thus, as the first contribution of
this paper, we describe a formal definition of this business
model to identify its main technological challenges. This
could help other research efforts focus on related problems.
In parallel with the increased popularity and ubiquity of
the IoT, many issues and challenges that need to be care-
fully addressed have arisen. In particular, the security of IoT
devices is crucial. As stated by numerous authors [8], [9],
it is not trivial to achieve an overall security level in IoT
ecosystems. Some IoT devices, such as wearables, keep sen-
sitive information from their users and, for this reason, attack-
ers are increasingly targeting these devices. Unfortunately,
some well-known security incidents such as Stuxnet [10],
the Mirai botnet, and other IoT zombie-related attacks [11],
which infect millions of IoT devices, have emphasized the
necessity of a security point of view when developing IoT-
related solutions. Other more generalist attacks include data
theft, device malfunction, and remote control [12]. In this
sense, solutions that tackle security problems associated with
IoT ecosystems are welcomed.
Identitymanagement falls under the umbrella of previously
described security problems. It can be informally defined
as the process of assigning identities to the different actors
in an IT ecosystem and is a relevant aspect in the security
process, as many attacks that are based on techniques such
as impersonation and identity theft, can be prevented by
solid identity management. For example, the Sybil attack
also affects the IoT [13] and is directly caused by deficient
identity management. Good identity management practices
also help to guarantee non-repudiation by identifying the
different actors in the system. To provide some insights about
the challenges associated with identity, it is estimated that
the cost of identity assurance processes exceeds 3.3£bn a
year in the UK and $22bn in the USA by extrapolating
the size of the population [14], without taking into account
the costs associated with storage, protection, breaches, and
regulations. By adding IoT into the equation, the numbers
were completely exorbitant. Hence, it is necessary to manage
the identity of all existing devices. Consequently, it seems
clear that it is worth thinking about new strategies for identity
management in the IoT world. Thus, as a second contribution
of this paper, we present a system to manage identity in the
IoTaaS business model.
Some authors[15] provided a broad overview of the con-
cept of identity and how it evolved over time. To sum up,
identity has suffered several transformations during the last
few years, starting from an isolated and centralizedmodel and
later moving to a federated model. However, these models
suffer from serious scalability and security issues. The last
suggested model is the self-sovereign identity (SSI) [14].
As explained in the following section, this model alleviates
some of the main problems in previous schemes and, there-
fore, our identity model for IoTaaS will be based on SSI.
In summary, the present research work provides two main
contributions: a) to formally present the IoT-as-a-Service
(IoTaaS) business model with its own characteristics and its
relevant technological challenges, and b) to propose an IdM
system based on SSI for this business model, including a
performance evaluation.
The different sections of the paper are organized as follows:
Section II shows the advances from the research community
regarding the ‘‘IoT-as-Service’’ model and analyzes the cur-
rent state of the art in self-sovereign identity for the IoT.
Section III formally presents the IoT-as-a-Service business
model and describes its associated technological challenges.
Section IV introduces the reader to the basic concepts of the
SSI paradigm. Section V describes the proposed design of the
SSI-based identity system for the business model. Section VI
validates the proposed identity system in terms of perfor-
mance. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section VII,
and further research directions are suggested.
II. STATE OF THE ART
As discussed in the introductory section, there is not
much literature about the concept ‘‘IoT-as-a-Service’’ Some
authors [6], [7] introduced this concept, but only described
it as a feasible business model and did not analyze all the
technological challenges that it implies. Others [16] go a
little bit further by describing four essential components
in the IoTaaS: sensors and gateways, middleware, backend
servers, output interface, but still lacks in properly proposing
a model. A search in Google Scholar using the keywords
‘‘IoT as a Service’’ or ‘‘IoT-as-a-Service’’ shows different
works including these terms. However, none of them refers to
the concept of IoT as a Service as considered in the present
work, which presents a business model based on offering IoT
devices on demand, while previous works refer to the inter-
section between the IoT and the cloud. For example, some
authors [17] presented an IoT solution for public safety and
disaster response (PSDR), while others [18] presented a for-
mal model integrating IoT and eHealth, and others [19], [20]
referred to IoT-as-a-Service as a combination between IoT
and cloud. Finally, other authors [21] propose an infrastruc-
ture for hosting IoT workloads in the cloud.
Regarding the SSI model from a research point of view,
some studies have proposed the application of the SSI
paradigm to the IoT. First, some authors [22] thoroughly
explained the SSI paradigm and presented decentralized iden-
tifiers (DIDs) and verifiable credentials for IoT. In addition,
they analyzed the suitability of SSI for IoT, proving that it is a
better method than the use of pretty good privacy (PGP) and
X.509 certificates.
Other studies have studied the applicability of the SSI
paradigm to the IoT world. For example, some authors [23]
introduced some SSI concepts and showed use cases for
the industrial IoT, while others [24] briefly mentioned the
intersection between SSI and IoT. These works show the
‘‘big picture’’ but they did not delve into any Credential
Exchange protocols or technical details. Other authors [25]
proposed the use of DIDs as identifiers for IoT devices and
accurately studied the requirements for IoT devices to run
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an SSI-based identity management system, even proposing a
proxy-based solution for extremely constrained IoT devices.
Other proxy-based solutions were also proposed by other
research works [26], in this case the IoT Exchange, to con-
nect IoT devices with users. However, they do not suggest a
specific verifiable credentials schema for the IoT and restrict
themselves to just analyzing DIDs as suitable identifiers for
the IoT. Other authors [27] presented an SSI protocol to trace
the origin of IoT devices.
SSI uses a decentralized registry that stores information
such as DIDs andDID documents (see Section IV for details).
This registry can be implemented using distributed ledger
technology (DLT), thus improving the overall security of the
system by preserving the integrity and availability of the
stored information. For example, some authors [28] proposed
an SSI scheme based on IOTA [29] for its DLT backbone, and
applied it to a rental car use case. The main problem of this
proposal is that IOTA is not fully decentralized because it still
depends on the coordinator, an element that centralizes the
consensus process. Similarly, others [30] also proposed IOTA
as a DLT for implementing the SSI scheme. They accurately
defend that IOTA is permissionless, has no transaction costs,
and scales well; however, the main drawback is that IOTA
is not fully decentralized. Furthermore, some mixed designs
have been proposed in which SSI is used in combination with
other elements in the same infrastructure [28], [30].
Finally, there are studies that focus on specific applications.
For example, some authors [31] proposed the use of a smart
band for biometric identification following an SSI scheme,
while others [32] particularized the SSI paradigm for Internet
of Vehicles (IoV).
From an industrial point of view, there are several technolo-
gies and frameworks that enable SSI for people, including
Hyperledger Indy (Sovrin) [33], uPort [34] (currently known
as Serto), Blockstack [35], Veres One [36], Jolocom [37],
Identity.com [38], Uniquid [39], ShoCard [40] and DIF [41],
which gather some of them under his umbrella. Moreover,
the Sovrin Foundation has conducted research on SSI and the
IoT [42] and provides some useful insights for its application.
However, none of these works consider the particularities
of the IoT-as-a-Service business model, such as the different
actors who participate in it and the differences between usage
and ownership of the devices. In addition, there is a lack
of studies on the performance evaluation of SSI-based IdMs
for IoT.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE IoTaaS BUSINESS MODEL
In this section, we analyze the IoTaaS business model to
identify its main technological challenges.
A. ACTORS IN THE BUSINESS MODEL
Let us consider a person or entity denoted as owner, which
possesses a set of IoT devices {Dn; n ∈ N}. Each device Dn
can be ‘‘hired’’ by any interested consumer (person or entity)
during a period of time. We will denote these consumers
as {Cm;m ∈ N}. With the term ‘‘hired,’’ it means that the
device is accessed for the data or services that it provides.
FIGURE 1. Relationships among actors in the IoTaaS business model.
For example, a consumer might be interested in the data
provided by an IoT device, such as temperature or wind
power readings, but also in using some services from this
device, such as a connectivity test against other systems,
or a notification in response to certain events. The amount
of money each consumer will pay for the data or services
will depend on the amount of time or resources that he/she
will consume from these devices, as well as the type of the
requested service, following a pay-per-use business model.
It is also possible to follow a subscription-based business
model in which consumers pay a periodic amount of money
(subscription) to access data or use services from devices.
Examples of possible real-life applications for IoTaaS are
sufficiently large to not be detailed in this paper.
This nomenclature can be extrapolated by considering sev-
eral owners, {Ok ; k ∈ N}, each having its own set of devices.
Each consumer Cm will be interested in obtaining services
or data from devices, Dn, if and only if those devices meet
some quality requirements. Certification entities, named as
{CE l; l ∈ N}, indicate that devices truly meet these quality
requirements. In other words, they trust customers. Many
actors, such as external auditors or manufacturers, can be
certification entities because they can certify some attributes
of the devices. Certification entities differ from Certificate
Authorities (CAs). Certificate Authorities are companies or
organizations that issue digital certificates (normally X.509)
to different entities on the Internet. A certification entity,
as described in the IoTaaS, is the actor who certificates some
attributes of a device. This can be done by using digital
certificates or by any other means. In the proposed identity
model, this is done by using verifiable credentials, so we have
decided to name it ‘‘certification entity’’, as this is a broader
term than Certificate Authorities. The different roles of the
business model are presented in Fig 1.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN THE IoTaaS
BUSINESS MODEL
Now, we briefly describe some of the main technological
challenges that appear when facing a real implementation of
the IoTaaS business model.
1) SERVICE ENDPOINT IDENTIFICATION AND AVAILABILITY
To begin with, one of the relevant aspects to tackle is defin-
ing how the services provided by devices will be offered to
and accessed by different consumers. With respect to access
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to services, the publish-subscribe pattern is an option for
communication between devices and consumers. Regarding
how to reach the services offered to consumers, it is quite
straightforward that we need mechanisms to connect con-
sumers with devices. One alternative taken from other as-
a-service solutions is the use of a marketplace, that is, a
mechanism to connect IoT devices with potential consumers.
For our purpose, this marketplace is an interface where IoT
devices are listed to be chosen by consumers. The market-
place also has the goal of preventing IoT devices from satu-
rating consumers’ requests, thus alleviating possible denial of
service (DoS) attacks, which can be especially severe if these
devices are resource constrained. However, the final design
of this marketplace could vary and become more complex
depending on the requirements of the final implementation,
as stated by some authors [43]. Thus, the marketplace appears
as an optional but highly desirable element, because it enables
more-constrained IoT devices to participate in the proposed
IoTaaS.
2) COMMUNICATION MODEL
This challenge has been identified as an open research
topic by several researchers. For example, some authors [44]
proposed a privacy-preserving query scheme for IoT using
homomorphic encryption, which can add an extra layer of
privacy to the communications. Transferring data among
IoT devices themselves or to the marketplace can be made
by using IoT-specific protocols, such as MQTT-S, as usual
in wireless sensor networks [45], or any other IoT-related
protocol. In addition, secure versions of the MQTT and
MQTT-S protocols might be considered, such as SMQTT and
SMQTT-S [46], if the security levels require them. Further-
more, the chosen solution must incorporate a mechanism to
allow queries so that consumers can search for devices using
different parameters, making it easier to select the most suit-
able one for their needs. In addition, the chosen mechanism
must be standardized, and ownerswill need to be aware of this
standard before publishing their devices in the marketplace.
As will be shown in Section V, the present research proposes
the use of queries over SSI verifiable presentations [47] to
achieve this goal. Communication between consumers and
the marketplace can be achieved using HTTPS or any other
secure protocol.
Service semantic definition
3) SERVICE SEMANTIC DEFINITION
There are some attributes of IoT devices that are important to
be shown and queried in IoTaaS, namely:
• Identifier
• Data type provided by the device
• Quality Certificates
• Cost
• Location and geographic scope
• Owner
Despite this being a minimum set of necessary attributes to
implement the business model, depending on the final imple-
mentation of the business model, some more attributes might
be included in this list. Two of these attributes are especially
relevant for the identity problem to generate trust: quality
certificates and owners. The quality certificate attribute col-
lects all the information related to the overall quality of the
IoT device, while the owner attribute defines the owner of
the device. Both attributes are directly related to the identity
problem, and in Section V, we deal with how they can be
modeled.
4) OPTIMIZATION
Another challenge to be analyzed is optimization. The range
of possible scenarios to be analyzed in IoTaaS was large.
Further studies on IoTaaS may study different optimization
problems associated with the business model. For example,
suppose that the expense of an IoT device Dn is En and its
expected benefit is Bn. Both En and Bn can be functions
of other variables, such as the type of data provided by the
device, its location, or its quality. Then, the optimization prob-
lems can be formulated with different objective functions that
allow us to know, for example, how to distribute the devices
among different locations, howmany quality certificatesmust
the devices have, or the number and type of devices to be
acquired to increase the profit.
Complex economic models can be built from this starting
point, for example, models that consider the implicit cost of
depreciation, which would impact En, or variable benefits
f (Bn) depending on non-stationary variables, such as season
or demand.
5) PAYMENT
Finally, another technological challenge is to provide mecha-
nisms that permit payment transactions. These mechanisms
should be carefully designed and suited for different sce-
narios. For example, micropayments could be made from
consumers to owners (traditional scheme), or directly carried
out to IoT devices, leveraging infrastructures such as DLT
(e.g., Blockchain) to manage and track transactions. With the
latter solution, the process could be made without owners’
intervention, using smart contracts as a method to automat-
ically send the money when a certain balance is reached.
In such an approach, it would be possible to decentralize the
payment solution, thus improving the privacy of involved par-
ties by using any type of blockchain address, such as the ones
implemented in Bitcoin [48] or Ethereum [49]. Still, it should
be considered that these addresses are pseudo-anonymized,
which means that privacy cannot be fully guaranteed, and
attacks such as de-anonymisation attacks [50], which attempt
to reveal the identity behind an address, can occur. Some
research works have shown blockchain-based micropayment
methods for IoT. For example, some authors [51] imple-
mented a micropayment method for IoT using the Bitcoin
network, while others [52] proposed the use of the Light-
ning Network (LN) of Bitcoin to enable micropayments in
IoT. Others [53] presented the idea of using blockchain as a
service for IoT to manage device configuration, store sensor
data and enable micro-payments. IOTA technology [29] was
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initially conceived to enable free transactions between IoT
devices and can be effectively used to implement the payment
method. Other authors [54] have advanced in this direction by
implementing an IOTA-basedmicropayment solution for IoT.
6) IDENTITY PROBLEM
The identity problem must be determined by assigning iden-
tities to the different actors of the system. Traditionally, the
identity problem on the Internet has been dealt with using
what is known as the isolated model. In the isolated model,
the service provider (SP) and the identity provider (IP) are the
same entity, being considered a relying party. Users need to
trust these components to store their identities, thus making
them become honeypots for attackers. A risk in the isolated
model is that IP might easily run away with all the identities,
or prevent the users from using the service, leaving them
completely unprotected. In addition, it acts as a single point
of failure (SPoF) because the entire system relies on it. With
the emergence and popularity of services on the Internet, the
isolated model became unmanageable because of the huge
number of identities to be managed by a single SP, so a
centralized model was developed to solve this issue. In this
model, the SP and IP are not the same entities. Instead,
different SPs share the same IP. However, it does not solve
the previous issues, because the users still need to trust an
external entity and the IP remains as an SPoF, thus becoming
a honeypot for attackers.
Finally, the federated model differs from the centralized
approach in the creation of trust relationships among different
IPs. It allows the establishment of networks of IPs, improving
the flexibility and overall trust of the system. However, the
subjacent problem still remains, that is, users need to trust
the IP, which can still invalidate the user’s identity at will.
In addition, scalability issues are not solved; as the number
of identities increases, the IP needs to properly manage them;
at the same time, it also becomes a honeypot for attackers
and an SPoF. In this context, the self-sovereign identity (SSI)
paradigm emerges, and it intends to solve the issues associ-
ated with the previous identity models.
IV. SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY PRELIMINARIES
SSI works with the concept of verifiable credentials (VCs)
issued to a holder by a trustable issuer as a digital equivalent
to traditional paper credentials, generated by government
authorities. A verifier could use a verifiable data registry
(VDR) to check whether the VCs presented by a holder are
valid.
These VCs are kept private under the control of the holder,
who can show them as proof when required from a veri-
fier. ‘‘Under the control of the holder’’ means that VCs are
normally stored in a wallet, i.e., a private user storage that
contains them, as well as different holder private keys. Each
corresponding public key is associated with an address that
is known as a decentralized identifier (DID), with a structure
defined by W3C [55]. DIDs provide a standard way to create
permanent, globally unique, crypto-verifiable identifiers for
people and organizations under their own control. Conse-
quently, DIDs are the first verifiable identifiers that do not
require registration authority. A DID can be looked up in
a blockchain or any anti-tampering decentralized registry
(VDR) to retrieve a DID document that contains informa-
tion such as the subject of the DID, the associated public
key, public credentials, network endpoints, authentication
protocols, and digital signs. Private DIDs are also possible
when involved parties want to keep their relationships private,
so DIDs do not necessarily need to be recorded in the VDR.
In a credential verification process, the holder is requested
to present a proof verifying that he fulfills certain require-
ments. This is known as verifiable presentation (VP), and is
based on the use of VCs. For example, an IoT device can
present a credential stating that it is waterproof. The verifier
is the person or entity that verifies the VP issued by the
holder. A claim proves certain attributes of the holderwithout
disclosing the entire credential information. The use of claims
avoids sharing personal and undesired information with third
parties, but only the required information. This is normally
achieved by using zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) cryptography
to prove that it has a specific attribute without having to
show the attribute itself. The W3C [47] standard proposes
at least three proof mechanisms: JSON web tokens (JWT)
secured using JSON web signatures (JWS), link data signa-
tures and Camenisch-Lysyanskaya zero-knowledge proofs.
More information about the relationship between verifiable
credentials and JWT tokens can be read in Section 6.3.1
of the standard. Technically, by using ZKPs, a holder can
use cryptography to generate a VP based on a VC without
disclosing the attributes of the VC, but still allow a verifier to
check if the proof is valid or not. Deeper information about
zero-knowledge proofs and their relationship with SSI can be
found in other works [56].
As can be deduced from the above, SSI provides many
benefits [14] against the rest of the models for identity man-
agement: isolated, centralized, and federated models. First,
it removes the need for ‘‘identity hubs’’ by empowering
the users to manage their own identities. Second, and more
importantly, when it comes to the IoT, it scales better as
a consequence of removing these identity hubs, which is
especially true in IoT environments [15], where ubiquity or
the existence of a myriad of devices are essential features to
be considered [9]. This fact clearly complicates the identity
management process using traditional approaches. Finally,
some authors [42] recognized some additional benefits when
applying SSI to the IoT, which can be summarized as an
increase in revenue, cost, and risk reductions. This study also
analyzes which cybersecurity threats affecting the IoT can be
mitigated using an SSI-based IdM.
One question to be addressed is whether IoT devices have
sufficient resources to run an SSI-based identity scheme.
As stated in Section II, some authors [25] precisely analyzed
the minimum requirements that IoT devices must have in
order to run an SSI solution and conclude that most devices
are able to do it. In addition, if this is not fulfilled, they
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FIGURE 2. Identification and verifiable credential management
subprocess.
FIGURE 3. Verification process.
propose a proxy-based approach for extremely constrained
devices.
After discussing why SSI is the best solution candidate
for a proposal in the IoTaaS identity management problem,
we present a novel SSI system for the implementation of
an identity solution. This system was designed following the
guidelines of the W3C standard for DIDs [55] and VCs [47].
Hence, in the proposal, we assume that all the processes, for
example, creation, storage, revocation, and presentation of
credentials, follow these standards and recommendations.
V. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE IoTaaS
We divide the proposal for the identity management process
in IoTaaS in the three subprocesses. The first subprocess
is called identification and initialization, and it is partially
represented in Fig 2. The second subprocess, shown in Fig 2
and Fig 3, is called the Credential management subprocess,
and the third one, shown in Fig 4, is called the service
consumption subprocess. In the following, we detail them.
A. IDENTIFICATION AND INITIALIZATION
Before describing the proposal for identity management in
IoTaaS, it is relevant to indicate that all the aforementioned
actors in IoTaaS, that is, certification entity (owner, manu-
facturer, or whoever), device, and consumer, can play dif-
ferent roles from the identity management perspective, that
is, issuer, holder, or verifier, depending on the stage of the
process in which they participate. In what follows, we clarify
this.
The first relevant aspect of the architecture is the iden-
tification of participants. Here, each device Dn has its own
DID to be identified and its own private and public keys
stored in its wallet for signing verifiable presentations. This
DID allows the identification of IoT deviceswhile preserving
their privacy. The DID and its corresponding DID document
creation and registration in the verifiable data registry (VDR)
follow the guidelines provided by some authors [25] and are
represented in Fig 2. It is required for the owner to enable
his devices to participate in IoTaaS. This can be done either
manually (the owner creates the devices’ DIDs and DID
documents) or automatically (the owner sends a one-time
token to his devices and they create their own DIDs and DID
documents). Ultimately, these DID and DID documents will
be registered in the VDR and, consequently, these deviceswill
be enabled in the IoTaaS business model.
Similarly, each consumer Cm and certification entity CE l
perform the same process of generating their own DIDs.
These DIDs, together with their corresponding DID docu-
ments, are stored in the VDR after their creation.
Another element will be part of this scheme as a solu-
tion for the service endpoint identification and availability
challenge, which is the marketplace. This element acts as a
directory for devices, where consumers can check whether
devices are available to provide the required data or services.
In addition, it behaves as a storage for verifiable presentations
(VPs), where devices store their proofs for their verifiable cre-
dentials (VCs). By doing so, consumers can check these VPs
directly from the marketplace, avoiding saturation of devices,
as discussed in Section III; in other words, it acts as a cache
for VPs. AsVCs are not stored in the marketplace, devices can
maintain control of the information sent to the marketplace
via VPs, which can be generated using ZKPs, thus ensuring
privacy as needed. Note that the marketplace cannot generate
ZKPs because this element is not the original holder of these
VCs, so only the devices can generate them. ZKPs could
be enabled in devices; if required, the marketplace acts as
a proxy for VPs containing these ZKPs. Note that there is
a tradeoff between security and performance because ZKPs
could improve the privacy of devices, but their use implies
that these devices would need to answer queries and verifi-
cation requests from consumers, as well as generate ZKPs,
which clearly impacts performance. In addition, notice that
the marketplace is preferably implemented as a distributed
system, thus avoiding becoming an SPoF. Centralization can
be avoided by using decentralized technologies to implement
the marketplace or even using multiple marketplaces [57].
Blockchain technologies are not a good candidate to be used
to implement the storage of VPs in the marketplace because
VPs cannot be removed from it, which goes against the right
to erasure defined in the GDPR [58], but using a blockchain
to ensure transparency through smart contracts and adding
an extra layer of security to the marketplace could be a good
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FIGURE 4. Service consumption process workflow.
solution, which can be tackled in future works. Other alter-
natives, such as distributed versions of the LDAP [59] can
be used to implement this component. In addition, we can
minimize the risk of identity theft attacks against the market-
place by using X.509 certificates to identify this component.
Furthermore, VPs are signed by eachDn, so no tampering can
be made by a malicious marketplace because consumers can
check the authenticity of the VPs by using a VDR.
B. CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT SUBPROCESS
This subprocess deals with two different aspects: i) how VCs
are issued and ii) how these credentials are verified.
Regarding credential issuing, we assume that a set of cer-
tification entities issues certain VCs to a device Dn. Hence,
from the point of view of identity management, the certifi-
cation entities act as issuers and the device is a holder. Note
that these VCs are part of the identity of devices and contain
information about eachDn, such as, for example, what quality
certificates it has. Hence, a device’s identity is composed of
all its VCs. For example, a manufacturer (acting as a trusted
certification entity) could certify the waterproof property for
all his devices issuing them a VC for this property. In addition,
these devices may have a different owner, Ok . The owner
could also act as a trusted certification entity by sending VCs
for specific features, such as ownership. Fig 2 represents this
VC issuing process by a certification entity after DID creation
and registration.
With respect to the verification process, consumers
{Cm;m ∈ N} in the IoTaaS model act as verifiers from an
identity management process, while devices {Dn; n ∈ N} play
the role of holders. Now, each device Dn generates a VP from
its set ofVCs, so anyone can check that the selected claims are
valid. This VP is signed by the devices and sent to the market-
place to be indexed. Now, the marketplace knows the DID of
the device. Consequently, consumers can query the market-
place to retrieve information about each device to determine
whether it satisfies their needs by checking its authenticity
against a trusted VDR. This process is illustrated in Fig. 3.
C. SERVICE CONSUMPTION SUBPROCESS
A consumer credential, which serves as proof of authoriza-
tion, is a special kind of VC that allows a consumer to access
data or services from an IoT device. This third subprocess
involves the consumer getting a consumer credential for
consuming data or services from an IoT device. The con-
sumer credential has its own attributes, being relevant the
issuanceDate, allowing anyone to know when it has been
issued and the OrganizationDate, which contains the date
when the credential is no longer valid, both specified in
the W3C [47]. These two dates define the timeframe during
which the consumer will be able to consume data from the
IoT device. A pay-per-use payment method would require
assigning a timeframe long enough and a revocation method.
Consumer credentials cannot be updated, so any update in
the credential, such as a new expirationDate implies a new
issuing process. In this subprocess, the device plays the iden-
tity management role of an issuer, while the consumer acts
as a holder. In addition, the device acts as a verifier for its
consumer credentials, as it can verify this credential issued
by itself to the corresponding consumer every time he wants
to consume data from it. Note that the marketplace could also
act as a verifier by checking the message signature from the
device against the VDR.
In addition, it is important to have a mechanism for the IoT
device to revoke the consumer’s access in case of payment
failure or breach of contract. In addition, some payment
methods, such as the pay-per-use, may require the revocation
of consumer credentials, where the consumer pays for the
number of resources consumed by the device, instead of the
time. Focusing on the revocation, there are no differences in
this procedure compared with the standard SSI revocation
process described by authors in [47]. Revocation is made by
using a revocation list recorded in the VDR, so the holderwill
no longer be able to prove that he has this valid credential
anymore. This approach has immense value for the issuer,
because the number of IoT devices is enormous and the issuer
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does not need to answer requests for every party desiring to
check whether a VC issued to a holder is valid or not, he just
needs to update this revocation list.
The service consumption subprocess is illustrated in Fig 4.
First, a consumer Cm queries the marketplace to select the
most suitable device for his/her needs. Remember that in
the Credentials management process, devices have sent a VP
with all the required VCs to the marketplace containing their
identity attributes, so the marketplace can perform queries
over the attributes in theVCs and return a list with the devices’
DIDs that match the consumer query. Once the consumer has
selected an available device Dn by its DID, he requests access
to this device and sends it a micropayment. As explained in
Section III, micropayments can be made either to the owner
or to the device, and the latter is preferable in terms of the
owner’s privacy. Then, ifDn agrees withCm request, it sends a
signed message to the marketplace. The marketplace then has
information about whether Dn is available for use, so it can
include the device in his list of available devices. Consumers
only have to check this list provided by the marketplace
without interrupting the normal operation of Dn.
This prevents other consumers from selecting this device.
Note that some devices may allow several concurrent con-
sumers, while others may not. This entirely depends on the
device configuration and capabilities and is beyond the scope
of this study. At the same time,Dn sends a consumer Creden-
tial to Cm so that he can connect to the IoT device, while this
credential is valid. Finally, the marketplace can check against
the VDR if the signature of the device is valid. However, the
use of consumer credentials as an authenticationmethod adds
security to the process while penalizing performance, because
devicesmust verify this credential each time an authentication
attempt from a consumer takes place. In this case, alternative
mechanisms could allow controlled access to devices, such as
the issuance of temporary access tokens. Further research can
study the optimal combination between tokens and consumer
credentials to achieve the best performance-security ratio.
Another interesting research topic could be the generation of
access tokens based on a given VC. However, in Section VI,
some performance measures are provided to show that the
access mechanism based on consumer credentials does not
actually imply performance degradation unless the device is
extremely constrained.
D. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Some security and privacy considerations about the pro-
posed identity model are given in this subsection. First,
we have already addressed the privacy of the exchanged
device attributes in Section IV. These can be protected by
devices by generating zero-knowledge proofs when com-
piling verifiable presentations, before sending them to the
marketplace.
Another aspect to be considered is related to data aggre-
gation. Data aggregation occurs when consumers aggregate
information from the same device when asking for different
verifiable presentations. This is a difficult privacy problem
to address, but ZKPs can solve this aggregation problem by
hiding unnecessary information. In addition, solutions to this
problem are often policy driven, so if a device wants to avoid
aggregation in his data, he can indicate it in the verifiable
presentation he generates.
Furthermore, other security risks must be considered, even
if ZKPs are used. Different side-channel attacks can be used
to retrieve useful information about the subject of verifi-
able credentials. For example, there are mechanisms on the
Internet to track individuals, such as cookies, web browser
fingerprinting or position information. The proposed scheme
cannot prevent the use of these tracking technologies if they
have been installed in the consumers or devices. Hence, their
use must be avoided in critical scenarios.
Another risk could appear when certification entities
include links in verifiable credentials. A verifiable credential
is tampering-protected, but the content outside this creden-
tial is not, so links can cause harm as the linked data can
be modified by an attacker. This can be avoided by using
content-integrity protection for links to external data, such
as storing the content in IPFS [60]. The W3C standard [47]
describes about how to protect against these and other attacks
in Sections 7 and 8.
The protection of cryptographic keys, which is a corner-
stone of signature processes, is also crucial to the iden-
tity management process. A trusted execution environment
(TEE) [61] is commonly known as an isolated processing
environment in which applications can run, separated from
the rest of the system and, most relevant to the present work,
can be used to protect the signing process as well as the
data (cryptographic keys) involved in it. The signing process
can also be protected by employing embedded cryptographic
keys using a trusted platform module (TPM) for embedded
systems [62].
VI. PERFORMANCE VALIDATION
The proposed system can be implemented as long as it com-
plies with W3C standards for DIDs and VCs ([55] and [47],
respectively). However, some questions arise regarding the
performance of the devices when the proposed protocol
is implemented. Although, as stated in Section II, some
authors [25] have suggested that most devices are able to
work with DIDs in terms of performance, we conducted some
tests to determine whether it is also possible for devices to
follow the proposed protocol and, specifically, to create and
validate consumer credentials. IoT devices frequently depend
on batteries, and it is important to check how SSI processes
consume them. As providing an accurate measure of battery
usage is dependent on the target device, we analyzed CPU
and RAM usage during the consumer credential creation
and verification processes to evaluate the number of con-
sumed resources, which provides more general conclusions.
Regarding the marketplace, its implementation is expected
in non-resource-constrained nodes that can be scaled with
more resources or even with more nodes. Thus, we con-
sider that, from a performance point of view, there are no
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specific issues. In addition, there are several possibilities to
implement this component, so it is not possible to measure
its performance as it depends on the final implementation.
The most basic implementation could be a database and a
web service. SQL databases do not seem to be very appro-
priate for implementing this component as it needs to store
verifiable presentations, which are unstructured. Thus, a non-
relational database, such as MongoDB seems to be more
appropriate [63]. Regarding the webservice, Apache [64] is
the most widely used web server in the world, but other alter-
natives are also possible. MongoDB benchmark results are
promising even with enormous amounts of data, performing
even better than MySQL [65]. Traffic is normally managed
through load balancers, such as Nginx [66], which allow to
distribute the requests between different servers, then scaling
the solution. Nginx can also substitute Apache as a web
server. Network latency is another aspect to be considered
when it comes to the final implementation, but it is always
present and is not an SSI-related issue. However, it is true
that the performed tests directly depend on network latency,
so a ping command has been used to determine the base
latency of the test network. To establish a baseline, each
ICMP package in the test network takes an average of 0.28ms
Round Time Trip (RTT), which is insignificant compared
to the obtained times. Finally, regarding consumers, the VC
creation and verification processes are equal to the processes
in the devices. In addition, consumers can run SSI clients
in a variety of hardware (laptops, smartphones, servers, etc).
Hence, the results have not been included in the present work
because they fully depend on the chosen hardware.
To conduct the tests, a Raspberry Pi 2 B was used as the
device. It is equipped with 1GB of RAM memory and uses
a 900MHz quad-core ARMCortex-A7 CPU. A low-resource
LUbuntu [67] operating system with a Hyperledger Indy [33]
client was installed in the device. Indy clients are currently
under the Hyperledger Aries project, and the library used
for testing has been the Aries Framework JavaScript project,
available in Github [68].
A wallet created in Raspberry Pi stores the consumer
credentials. Aries agents are the software used to connect
different SSI actors. Another computer located in the same
network plays the consumer role by first receiving a consumer
credential and then sending a VP with this credential to the
Raspberry Pi, which must validate it. The described experi-
ment is shown in Fig 5.
In this setup, we first measure the time spent by both
the consumer credential exchange and the consumer creden-
tial verification, both within the service consumption sub-
process seen in Section V. Aries implements a several-step
mechanism between consumer and device, similar to a TCP
handshake, to complete these exchange and verification pro-
cesses. We take 5,000 samples of every process and take the
mean and standard deviation values. In addition, we created
10,000 consumer credentials in the device to evaluate the time
spent on this process. Besides the time evaluation, RAM and
CPU usage are measured in the device for both processes
FIGURE 5. Experimental setup.
TABLE 1. Experimental results.
as well. The results are shown in Table 1. CPU percentages
were averaged among the four available logic cores in the
Raspberry Pi. Tests were conducted using JEST [69] scripts,
each of which took approximately 50 seconds to complete.
Consequently, CPU and RAM usage were measured during
these 50 s. To establish a baseline, launching a JEST script
that only loads the Aries libraries takes approximately 12 s
and consumes 6MB of RAM memory and 4% of the CPU.
The following conclusions can be drawn from these results.
First, higher times are obtained in the processes for exchang-
ing and verifying consumer credentials, rather than in creat-
ing them, through a VP. Second, regarding RAM and CPU
usage, it is not a resource-intensive task, so most devices
should be able to perform these operations. Consequently,
we can conclude that network latency will be the main factor
that affects performance, although a slower CPU in the target
device can degrade it. However, according to the experiment,
the minimum required RAM was approximately 150MB.
Tests conductedwith several consumer credentials exchanges
in parallel do not seem to have a significant impact on CPU
and RAM usage. Finally, we can conclude that the consumer
credential exchange process is slightly faster than verifica-
tion. The reason for this might be that the device needs to
verify the validity of the VP, which adds extra complexity.
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JavaScript is a quite efficient language thanks to its asyn-
chrony and allows the Raspberry Pi to achieve reasonable
times because devices can perform other tasks while waiting
for the next step in the consumer credential exchange and
verification processes. Hence, JavaScript is appropriate for
the implementation of Aries clients for IoTaaS, avoiding the
blocking of the devices between these steps.
It is important to note that these numbers can vary depend-
ing on factors such as network latency, intermediate network
hops, and device capabilities. However, the results presented
here are promising and show that most deviceswill be able to
run the scheme without any issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the IoTaaS business model from a
formal perspective, together with its associated technological
challenges, and proposed an IdM based on self-sovereign
identity (SSI). This system includes a marketplace as a mech-
anism to connect consumers with devices and store verifiable
presentations. IoTaaS is a promising business model that will
enable the reutilization of IoT devices for different use cases
and applications. However, it will be necessary to propose an
implementation for the different challenges exposed in this
document, as it has been done with the identity problem. The
performance results also show that it is possible to implement
SSI-based IdMs for IoTaaS.
Finally, once the fundamentals of SSI are on the table and
their synergies with the IoT are clear, some domain-specific
research works (IoTaaS or other) merging these two topics
will appear and adapting the general SSI principles to these
particular use cases will not be straightforward. In IoTaaS, the
marketplace has shown this, acting as a storage for verifiable
presentations. Finally, further research in this field includes
the integration of SSI into other components, such as micro-
payment systems and access control engines.
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